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It is not the purpose of these remarks to comment on the various conflicts 
considered by Professor Walker. Rather, they seek to draw attention to general 
problems relating to naval warfare law raised by the paper. 
Professor Walker righdy draws attention to the varied sources or agencies 
from which evidence as to the rules on international law may be drawn, and 
there can be no doubt that the rules of armed conflict may be drawn from similar 
sources, bearing in mind in this context the significance of the Martens clause 
with its reference to "usages established among civilized peoples, the laws of 
humanity and the dictates of the public conscience". 1 While it is true that Hague 
Convention IV relates to warfare on land, it cannot be denied that these same 
basic principles are of general application, regardless of the theatre involved. This 
view finds some support in the Preamble to Convention IX of 1907 relating to 
Bombardment by Naval Forces,2 which expressly refers to "the desire to serve 
the interests of humanity and to diminish the severity and disasters of war." 
Care must be taken, however, not to exaggerate the significance of analogies, 
for, as Judge Badawi Pasha has pointed out,3 "in international law, recourse to 
analogy should only be had with reserve and circumspection." Caution must 
therefore be exercised in applying the rules which have been enunciated for one 
dimension of activity to another, unless the rules in question are of so general a 
character that it is obvious that they are intended to apply to armed conflict 
generally, regardless of whether it be conducted on land, at sea or in the air. This 
is particularly important in relation to Protocol I which expressly states in Article 
49 that "the provisions of [the] Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all attacks 
in whatever territory conducted, including the national territory belonging to a 
Party to the conflict but under the control of an adverse Party." This latter 
reference to 'territory under the control of an adverse party' clearly implies that 
it relates to land. Moreover, the Article goes on to state that its "provisions ... 
apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian population, 
individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all attacks .from 
the sea • •. against objectives on land but do not otherwise qffoct the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict at sea . ... (emphasis supplied)4 Clearly, therefore, 
the Protocol is only of direct effect insofar as naval warfare is concerned when 
that warfare is directed against the land. As to warfare at sea, whether it involves 
belligerent or neutral shipping or nationals belonging to an adverse party or to 
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a neutral power, it is the traditional customary law, plus the relevant Hague 
Conventions that govern, and the Protocol provision "has no application to 
ship-to-ship ... combat. ,,5 The Protocol, therefore, is only relevant to the extent 
that it reproduces customary rules of warfare which may be regarded as of a 
general or fundamental character. Thus, rules regarding proportionality would 
be relevant,6 for "[t]he principle of proportionality is a general principle of the 
law of armed conflict which has found its expression in such provisions as the 
prohibition of , unnecessary' suffering" in Article 23(c) of the Hague Regulations 
annexed to Convention IV? These comments apply even more emphatically 
to the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States,S which 
does not purport to deal in any way with the law of armed conflict other than 
somewhat superficially in regard to war crimes. Any comments made in the 
Restatement concerning the registration of ships or any other matter can hardly 
be said to "provoke a[ny] spillover effect into the law of armed conflict.,,9 
In his paper, Professor Walker has excluded any consideration of sea to air 
engagements, whether directed against enemy or neutral aircraft. However, it 
should be noted that civil aircraft are as much "transports" as are merchant ships, 
while NWP 9 constandy coalesces its comments regarding both seagoing vessels 
and aircraft. It is perhaps proper, therefore, that at least some comment be made 
with regard to the targeting of civil aircraft. There can be no question that if 
there is ample evidence to indicate that a neutral aircraft is so assimilated to the 
forces or service of an adverse party, it is as amenable to attack as is a neutral 
merchant vessel in similar circumstances. However, the restrictions which 
traditional naval warfare law imposes with regard to the safety of personnel would 
not be normally applicable if such aircraft were attacked. The problem of a civil 
aircraft belonging to a belligerent arose in its most glaring form in relation to the 
attack upon an Iranian civil aircraft by the USS Vincennes during the Gulf War. 
This is perhaps not the place to consider whether the United States was in the 
position of a belligerent during that conflict and, if so, the identity of its adverse 
party. The fact that Captain Rogers considered himself to be under attack and 
the fact that United States naval forces were engaged in combat with Iranian 
vessels on occasion enables us to comment at least briefly on this particular 
incident. This attack, combined with warnings directed also to neutral aircraft 
in the vicinity of U.S. naval craft, while flying in an internationally recognized 
scheduled airlane, emphasizes the importance of careful attention not only to 
rules of engagement, but also to the factual situation, proper reading of tech-
nological information and, especially, the maintenance of proper training and 
discipline on individual vessels. The issue of wrongful determination of the 
intention of an aircraft in the vicinity of operations must, in the first instance, 
be the responsibility of the naval commander, provided, however, that he 
exercises all reasonable precautions that may be expected of one of his rank when 
in action. This is particularly important in view of the provision in NWP 910 
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that "civilian airliners in flight are subject to capture but are exempt from 
destruction ••• unless at the time of the encounter they are being utilized by 
the enemy for a military purpose ... or refuse to respond to the directions of 
the intercepting warship." It is also probably required that the naval commander 
should be reasonably certain that his "directions" are received and understood. 
It is recognized that this may put a heavy burden upon the naval commander in 
question, but it would appear, since such aircraft are prima facie immune from 
destruction, that the burden of denying immunity or protection rests upon him.. 
Although, as has been pointed out, Professor Walker has drawn attention to 
the problem of proportionality, which may be said to underlie the whole of the 
law of armed conflict, and although he comments on it in the light of Protocol 
I,ll it is suggested that he perhaps over-extends the analogies from land warfare 
with which the relevant sections of the Protocol deal. It is further suggested that 
he has not fully discussed the problem as it may arise in actual naval combat. A 
merchant vessel which may well be a legitimate target in the circumstances may 
nevertheless have to be granted immunity from attack on account of the 
disproportionate damage that would ensue, particularly to the environment or 
of a long-term character, if an attack were launched. This issue could easily arise 
if the vessel in question were an oil tanker or, even more seriously, nuclear-
powered. He bases his approach to this issue on the attacker's intent to destroy 
the vessel, without paying sufficient attention to the direct and reasonably 
anticipated consequences of such an attack.12 In such a case it might well be that, 
regardless of the legitimacy of the target, a naval commander might be required 
by his rules of engagement to consult with his political masters whether an attack 
should be undertaken. The effect of the destruction of such a vessel, particularly 
if that effect could result in damage to a neutral coast, might be so dispropor-
tionate to the advantage to be gained from a sinking that a commander would 
be well-advised, ifhe is unable to capture the vessel, to allow it to continue on 
its way. 
A further problem arises concerning attacks on vessels carrying food, or, as in 
the Korean war, fishing vessels-a problem that would be aggravated if the 
adverse party was essentially a fish-eating state. While it is true that in customary 
law food may be considered as conditional contraband, new attitudes with regard 
to proportionality and the rights of non-combatants would require greater care 
than may have been necessary in the past. Once again a commander might have 
to weigh with care the effects of a sinking upon the civilian population as distinct 
from preventing a cargo of food that might be intended for the armed forces of 
the adverse party. The fact that NWP 9 is silent on the status of even coastal 
fishing vessels should not be taken to mean that such vessels belonging to 
nationals of the adverse party are automatically to be considered as legitimate 
targets either for sinking or capture, although if there is sufficient economic 
intelligence available to suggest a reasonable conclusion that the food is in fact 
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intended for the armed forces there would be justifiable grounds to seize the 
vessel and submit it to prize jurisdiction. There is strong ground for arguing that, 
regardless of technical and similar changes that have taken place in recent years, 
the law remains as it was settled by Hague Convention XI13 in 1907, until such 
time as that Convention has been revised. It should be remembered that at 
Nuremberg the Tribunal took the line that "by 1939 [after a mere thirty years 
the] rules [laid down in Hague Convention IV] were recognized by all civilized 
nations as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred 
to in Article 6(b) of the Charter" establishing the Tribunal.14 The Preamble to 
Convention XI states that "it is expedient to lay down in written mutual 
engagements the principles which have hitherto remained in the uncertain 
domain of controversy. or have been left to the discretion of Governments." 
Perhaps even more significant was the attitude of the Tribunal with regard to 
the London Naval Agreement of 193015 and the 1936 Protocol16 concerning 
unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant ships. The fact that both sides 
had indulged in such warfare did not remove guilt from Doenitz and Raeder17 
in respect of having ordered such breaches of the law. The law remains despite 
naval practice, but punishment for breaches in such circumstances may be 
discounted. 
In this regard, it must be emphasized that international law is the product of 
state practice as evidenced by custom or by agreement in treaty. However, the 
mere fact that a treaty has not been amended or denounced does not mean that 
it remains declaratory of the law when belligerents have ceased to comply with 
its provisions. Such behavior may indicate that the treaty has fallen into desuetude 
and that the contrary practice, particularly when pursued by both sides without 
protest or attempt to indict an adverse party with criminality, is a better indication 
of what they consider acceptable or legitimate. 
Professor Walker suggests18 that "[a]n inference could be made that the 
negotiators [of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea19] would not have included [in 
its protective provisions] all merchant seamen, including those aboard enemy 
merchant vessels, if they did not feel that all such ships were subject to attack, 
which had become the norm during World War II." It could perhaps even more 
easily be inferred that it was because such conduct had become the norm during 
World War II, the draftsmen sought to protect such merchant seamen and to 
emphasize that if they were the victims of unlawful attacks they were still to be 
protected. 
While it may be true that the humanitarian law of armed conflict is part of 
the law of human rights, it may be submitted that the instance cited in the Walker 
R 20 ." f ·cIal .. [ d eport concernmg a war 0 genocl expenmentatlOn at sea, or an or er 
by an] individual commander that directs execution of a captured crew with 
genocidal intent" does not need any reference to general human rights law or 
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the specific crime of genocide. In view of the accepted law with regard to war 
crimes, regardless of the theatre in which they are committed, to base criminality 
on the general body of human rights law in such circumstances would only 
amount to "gilding the lily". The reference21 to the perfidious use of the 
protective emblem with regard to cultural property is not confined to a vessel 
purporting to be carrying such property. It is of general application with regard 
to the use of any protective emblem, and is merely indicative of the problem 
that will face any commander who suspects that an emblem is being improperly 
used. Similarly, it is suggested that the references made to the 1958 Law of the 
Sea Conventions are not really in point since they are dealing with the normal 
uses of the sea in time of peace and do not purport in any way to affect the rights 
of belligerents, for, as Professor Walker himself points out,22 the freedom of the 
high seas is exercised-and therefore limited by- "the other rules of interna-
tionallaw" as well as the stipulations of the Convention. Equally the reference 
in UNCLOS, 1982, that "the high seas shall be used only for peaceful pur-
poses,,23 implies that the contents of that Convention have no relevance to naval 
warfare, at least until such time as there is no doubt that naval warfare as 
traditionally conducted is contrary to international law pcr sc. 
Rather than drawing analogies from Protocol I, it might be better, particularly 
in view of the number of major naval powers that have failed to ratify this 
instrument, and of the fact that there is by no means universal agreement as to 
which articles of the Protocol amount to rules of customary law in regard to 
warfare on land, let alone to fundamental principles underlying the law of armed 
conflict as such, to ignore the terms of the Protocol and seek to evolve a draft 
applicable to naval warfare alone. Moreover, it should be remembered that 
Protocol I is intended to elaborate the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as they 
apply to humanitarian law in armed conflict. In the light of the experience of 
World War II and the technological advances that have evolved since, it would 
appear that the various Hague and later agreements concerning naval warfare 
have become somewhat archaic and tend to be disregarded. Experience in the 
Gulf War and the use of protective fleets by non-participants suggest that it is 
time to revise also the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare and to 
re-examine their right to establish protective convoys,24 for it is submitted the 
legal position is not as clear as Professor Walker asserts.25 Any such revision 
would, of course, make use of any relevant principles to be found in the 
agreements mentioned by Professor Walker. 
However, to seek to extend to naval warfare principles especially drafted with 
a view to the needs ofland warfare often makes the exercise somewhat artificial 
and far-fetched. This is particularly true when the specific provisions of Protocol 
I are incompatible with the customary or previously established treaty law 
relevant to naval warfare.26 The comments here made with regard to Protocol 
I are equally applicable to the Protocols appended to the 1980 Conventional 
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Weapons Convention.27 At the same time it should always be borne in mind 
that the fact that neither a specific Convention nor customary law specifically 
"requires or approves or permits" a particular line of conduct, such as the 
establishment of a "Red Cross Box" during the Falklands conflict,28 does not in 
any way prevent the parties to the conflict from setting up any similar "box" or 
making any arrangement that they choose and, as between themselves, this 
would even apply to an arrangement derogating from a treaty requirement. This 
is probably true even of those agreements that have been made for the protection 
of persons hors de combat, unless it can be maintained that the treaty provision in 
question amounted to a principle of jus cop-ens applicable to the protection of 
human rights even during armed conflict.29 
In connection with the Gulf War and the destruction and attacks on neutral 
shipping, Professor Walker draws attention to Commander Fenrick's com-
ment:30 
It is somewhat surprising that the actions ofIran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf did 
not generate a stronger, or at least more vociferous, response on the part of other 
states. It is presumed the relative lack of response is owing to the desire of the 
superpowers to avoid conflict with each other in a sensitive area .... 
In view of the apparent willingness of the superpowers to tolerate the situation 
and indulge in minesweeping, chartering or reflagging of vessels, it seems 
unlikely that such a conflict might have ensued. Perhaps it may be suggested that 
the reason for the lack of more vigorous response was that the superpowers were 
not prepared to state that Iranian and Iraqi practices were in conflict with the 
rights of belligerents to attack neutrals when there was some evidence to suggest 
that they were in fact trading with or indirectly supporting a belligerent. 
Moreover, practice during World War II, as well as during the Gulf War, 
suggests that belligerents will disregard the former distinction between absolute 
and conditional contraband or the requirement that contraband lists be publish-
ed, and will instead seek to inhibit any trade with an adverse party, contending 
that such trade automatically assists the economic war effort, which would appear 
to be recognized by NWP 931 and this, moreover, seems to be Commander 
Fenrick's current view?2 While it is true that both Fenrick's proposals and the 
draft to have come out of Pisa and Bochum33 are completely unofficial, they 
may be indicative of the manner in which the law of naval warfare, at least in 
regard to the targeting of merchant vessels, might proceed. 
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